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NOTES
ALIENAGE JURISDICTION AND THE PROBLEM
OF STATELESS CORPORATIONS: WHAT IS A
FOREIGN STATE FOR PURPOSES OF
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)?
I. INTRODUCTION
The globe is divided into manifold nation-states, each possessing legal
sovereignty.' The boundaries that delineate these states, however, are not
immanent in nature,2 nor do they exist as the consequences of pure, socially
decontextualized reason.3 Rather, national boundaries are products of history;
they are the result of military, political, economic and social interaction
Colonialism, 5 once widespread, 6 shaped many of the legal boundaries of our
1. This acutely obvious point is nonetheless an historic anomaly. See generally BENEDICT
ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM
(1983) (arguing that the modem nation-state is an imagined community unlike previous forms of
political ordering); MALCOM ANDERSON, FRONTIERS: TERRITORY AND STATE FORMATION IN THE
MODERN WORLD 10 (1997) ("A specific conception of the frontier originated in the violent process of
state formation in western Europe in the early modem period. Since then frontiers have marked the
limit of an authority to rule, the sharp line at which sovereignty ran out."); ERNEST GELLNER,
NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983); E.J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780:
PROGRAMME, MYTH, REALITY (1990); TERRY H. PICKETT, INVENTING NATIONS: JUSTIFICATIONS OF
AUTHORITY IN THE MODERN WORLD (1996) (discussing various humanistic meta-narratives informing
modem conceptions of political order); J.RV. PRESCOTT, POLITICAL FRONTIERS & BOUNDARIES
(1987) (providing a detailed historic exploration of boundary formation and dispute patterns).
2. National boundaries do not devolve from nature, but that is not to say the natural world does
not influence the formation of such boundaries. See PAUL BUCKHOLTS, POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY
(1966). Even then, human exertions to delineate what is "natural" are historically contingent. See
MORAG BELL ET AL., GEOGRAPHY & IMPERIALISM (1995).
3. That reason could exist in a pure, socially decontextualized fashion is itself an untenable
proposition, as critical theory has energetically polemicized over recent decades. See generally
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (Alan Sheridan trans., 1972); MICHAEL
FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (Vintage 1973)
(1970). Nonetheless, there is a difference between the reason one might use to divide a tabula rasa
planet into administrative regions and the collision of colonialist reason and history that has given us
the current national boundaries of, say, Africa.
4. See generally works cited supra note 1.
5. Definitional controversy attends most academic discourse, but modem colonialism can be
defined as:
the establishment and maintenance for an extended time of rule by alien minorities who
represented, among other things, machine-oriented civilization, powerful economies, Christian
origins, rapid pace of life, and who asserted feelings of racial and cultural superiority over
indigenous majorities who were separate from and subordinate to the ruling colonial race.
Georges Balandier, La situation coloniale: Approach theorique, Cahiers Internationaux de Socilogie,
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world.7 Today, multistate trade alliances, such as the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), 8 the World Trade Organization ("WTO")f
and the European Union ("EU"), 0 are reconfiguring the global legal map."
This Note explores how the globe's dynamic mix of legal sovereignties
interacts with the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts in the
United States. Particularly, it examines alienage jurisdiction, the type of
diversity jurisdiction12 available in suits between U.S. citizens and citizens or
subjects of foreign states.' 3
XI 51 (1951) 75-76, quoted in "Introduction, THE JAPANESE COLONIAL EMPIRE, 1895-1945, at 4-5
(Ramon Myers & Mark Peattie eds., 1984).
6. See generally works cited supra note 1. For an important historical reaction, see V.I. LENIN,
IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM (1917). For a legal perspective on the colonialism
of the United States, see Efren Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The
Insular Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225 (1996). See also LOUIS L. SNYDER, THE
IMPERIALISM READER (1962).
7. See generally works cited supra note 1.
8. See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L, 103-182, 107 Stat.
2057 (1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473). The NAFTA became effective in 1994. See
generally JAMES R. HOLBEIN & DONALD J. MUSCH, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
(1995); BARRY APPLETON, NAVIGATING NAFTA: A CONCISE USER'S GUIDE TO THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (1994); Symposium, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 611 (1992) (containing
a collection of North American Free Trade Agreement articles).
9. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM (1990); JOHN H.
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (1989); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW
OF GATT (1969); Thomas J. Dillon, The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for World
Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349 (1995); World Trade Organization Home Page (last modified June
12, 1998) <http://www.wto.org>.
10. See generally John P. Flaherty & Maureen E. Lally-Green, The European Union: Where Is It
Now?, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 923 (1996).
11. For a comparative gloss on these multinational intergrations, see PAUL TAYLOR,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN THE MODERN WORLD: THE REGIONAL AND THE GLOBAL PROCESS
(1993), which compares the European Union and the United Nations. See also John P. Fitzpatrick, The
Future of the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of Regional
Economic Institutions and the Harmonization of Law in North America and Western Europe, 19
HOUS. J. INT'L L. I (1996). On a more ethereal level, a dialog exists regarding the extent to which the
information age will alter national sovereignties. See, e.g., Timothy S. Wu, Note, Cyberspace
Sovereigny?-The Internet and the International System, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 647 (1997).
12. Alienage jurisdiction is not a ubiquitous term, even though alienage jurisdiction has been
around for more than 200 years. Alienage jurisdiction is sometimes referred to as a component of
diversity jurisdiction, and indeed the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, is the current codification for
alienage jurisdiction. Whether alienage jurisdiction is a type of diversity jurisdiction or is its own
phylum is a contested topic. Some courts have called it diversity jurisdiction based on diversity
between a U.S. party and a citizen or subject of a foreign state. Other courts have labeled it alienage
jurisdiction, and one court has even called it "alienage diversity jurisdiction." Despite this tendency to
collapse alienage jurisdiction into diversity jurisdiction, it is a separate concept, supported by
rationales that are wholly distinct from those supporting diversity jurisdiction of the more common
sort, i.e., parties from different states of the United States. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Why
Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction
over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALEJ. INT'LL. 1 (1996).
13. The relevant portion of the judicial code is 28 U.S.C. § 1332:
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss3/5
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The federal circuits currently disagree whether corporations organized
under the laws of certain foreign entities can gain access to the federal courts
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.14 Specifically, the circuits disagree whether federal
subject matter jurisdiction exists in cases between a U.S. citizen and an alien
corporation registered under the laws of a foreign entity that lacks clear
recognition as a "foreign state." Corporations so situated can include those
established under the laws of British colonies or former colonies.1 5
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is
between-
(1) citizens of different States
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are
additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a
State or of different States.
For the purposes of this section, section 1335 and section 1441, an alien admitted to
the United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which
such alien is domiciled.
(b) Except where express provision therefor is otherwise made in a statute of the United States,
where the plaintiff who files the case originally in the Federal courts is finally adjudged to be
entitled to recover less than the sum or value of $75,000, computed without regard to any setoff or
counterclaim to which the defendant may be adjudged to be entitled, and exclusive of interest and
costs, the district court may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs on the
plaintiff.
(c) For the purposes ofthis section and section 1441 of this title-
(1) a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been
incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business, except that in
any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability insurance, whether
incorporated or unincorporated, to which action the insured is not joined as a party-
defendant, such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of the State of which the insured is a
citizen, as well as of any State by which the insurer has been incorporated and of the
State where it has its principal place of business; and
(2) the legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall be deemed to be a citizen
only of the same State as the decedent, and the legal representative of an infant or
incompetent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the infant or
incompetent.
(d) The word "States," as used in this section, includes the Territories, the District of Columbia,
and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
14. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) authorizes jurisdiction when the suit arises among
"citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state." See Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily,
188 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that a Hong Kong corporation could not sue two New York
corporations in federal court because Hong Kong was not a state). But cf. Wilson v. Humphreys
(Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that U.S. plaintiffs could sue a corporation
created under the laws of the Cayman Islands, a British Dependent Territory).
15. These include Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, St. Helena, the Falkland Islands,
Gibraltar and the British Virgin Islands. Before the People's Republic of China resumed sovereignty
over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997, Hong Kong had been a British Colony for 155 years. See RODA
MUSHKAT, ONE COUNTRY, TWO INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITIES: THE CASE OF HONG KONG
1-41 (1997).
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Corporations created under the laws of British Dependent Territories are
products of legal entities that are not recognized "states." This raises
questions because alienage jurisdiction is explicitly for suits between U.S.
citizens and citizens or subjects of foreign states.16
The circuit split on this point presents an interesting legal question 7 and
one of more than pedantic interest. As two international practitioners recently
noted, "These [problematic] jurisdictions are the international equivalent of
Delaware or Nevada for many clients."'18 Moreover, due to ever increasing
international trade19 and the escalating importance of regional trade
16. The Constitution provides that "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ... between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
The constitutional grant of jurisdiction is extended to the courts in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). See supra
note 13.
17. This is just the sort of narrow, technical issue that has allowed legions of law students,
professors and practitioners to chum out commentary esteemed only by other lawyers, if even by them.
For more information (and some humor and additional cynicism) on this point, there is an
enjoyable thread of law review articles reflecting on various aspects of the law review endeavor. See
Arthur Austin, Footnote Skulduggery and Other Bad Habits, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1009 (1990);
Arthur D. Austin, Footnotes as Product Differentiation, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1131 (1987); J.M. Balkin
& Sanford Levinson, How to Win Cites and Influence People, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 843 (1996); C.
Steven Bradford, As I Lay Writing: How To Write Law Review Articles for Fun and Profit: A Laiv-
and-Economics, Critical, Hermeneutical, Policy Approach and Lots of Other Stuff that Thousands of
Readers Will Find Really Interesting and Therefore You Ought to Publish in Your Prestigious, Top-
Ten, Totally Excellent Law Review: [this space reserved]:, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 13 (1994); Herma Hill
Kay, In Defense of Footnotes, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 419 (1990); Patrick M. McFadden, Fundamental
Principles ofAmerican Law, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1749 (1997); Michael I. Swygert & Jon W. Bruce, The
Historical Origins, Founding, And Early Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews, 36 HASTINGS
L.J. 739 (1985); Phil Nichols, Note, A Student Defense of Student Edited Journals: In Response to
Professor Roger Cramton, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1122. To understand the carnage a student editor can
cause, see James Lindgren, Fear of Writing, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 1677, 1678 (1990) ("Discussing fine
points of English usage with a battalion of law review editors armed with the Texas Manual on Style is
a bit like trying to carry on rational discussions with followers of astrology. No amount of reasoned
argument can shake their belief in rule by the stars.")
For an interesting discussion of the history of footnotes in general, see ANTHONY GRAFTON, THE
FOOTNOTE: A CURIOUS HISTORY (1997).
18. William Wilson II & Jonathan K. Cooperman, 2d Circuit Bars Suits by "Offshore"
Corporations/Decision Precludes Hong Kong, Caribbean Companies from Bringing Suits in Federal
Court, NAT'L L.I., Aug. 25, 1997, at B9. This article, published only two days after the Matimak
decision was issued, paired Matimak and Wilson for contrast and is the inspiration for this Note. The
article suggested these offshore incorporations are popular because they offer favorable tax regimes,
administrative convenience and developed legal systems.
19. See Kristen Bole, Port of Oakland Trade is Catching Asia's Economic Flu, S.F. BUS. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 1998, at 3 (discussing increase in imports from Asia and decrease in exports following
devaluation of several Asian currencies); Michael R. Sesit, HongKong's "Peg" to Dollarls a Global-
Markets Pillar, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 1998, at C1 (noting many financial analysts view the Hong Kong
dollar's link to the U.S. dollar as crucial to containing recent Asian financial problems, and quoting
analyst Gary Dugan of J.P. Morgan Securities as saying, "We see removal of the Hong Kong peg [to
the dollar] as the key risk to all global [stock] markets .... It would be the straw that breaks the
camel's back, setting in train a new round of devaluations in Asia that would have a wider impact on
global growth.").
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alliances,20 the question of how to handle "stateless corporations' 21 in federal
jurisdiction will grow in importance.2
Part II of this Note provides a context for discussion of the stateless
corporation issue by reviewing the history of alienage jurisdiction and
considering two recent conflicting federal appellate decisions concerning
alienage jurisdiction for stateless corporations. Part III assesses the strength
of the judicial approach to the stateless corporation problem discussed in Part
II and argues for a flexible reading of foreign state, so that alienage
jurisdiction obtains in close calls. Under this proposal, suits between a U.S.
citizen and a citizen or subject23 of a foreign political territory with which the
United States has substantial political and economic exchanges qualify for
alienage jurisdiction, absent contrary intent by another branch of
government. This result is particularly appropriate in cases where
"derivative" or "composite" sovereignty is found.24
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History ofAlienage Jurisdiction
Article III of the Constitution established alienage jurisdiction,25 and since
the early days of the Republic it has been statutorily conferred by Congress
26
20. See Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward A Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997) (noting the striking success of the European
Union at transnational adjudication and advocating possible transplantation of that success).
21. "A stateless corporation is an oxymoron," quipped the dissenting judge in Matimak v.
Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 89 (2d Cir. 1997) (Altimari, J., dissenting), responding to the majority's finding
that a Hong Kong corporation is stateless and therefore, like a stateless person, cannot avail itself of
alienage jurisdiction. However, there are portents of stateless corporation emergence in the
supranational arena. See generally David C. Donald, Company Law in the European Community:
Toward Supranational Incorporation, 9 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1, 10-24 (1991) (discussing proposals for
Pan-European Union company law). Corporations created under the European Union would also
appear to be stateless under current law.
22. See generally U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Office of Trade and Economic Analysis (visited June
10, 1998) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/cgi-bin/oteactr?task=-otea>; International Trade Administration,
Monthly Trade Update (last modified Feb. 7, 1996) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/industry/oteaI
usftu.html>.
23. Corporeal or corporate citizens or subjects, as currently understood.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 144-46.
25. See U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2, cl. 1.
26. Alienage jurisdiction is currently conferred in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). See supra note 13.
Congress amended section 1332 in 1996, increasing the amount in controversy requirement to
$75,000. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, tit. U1, § 205(a), 110 Stat.
3847, 3850. In 1988, Congress raised the amount to $50,000 from $10,000. See Federal Courts Study
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. II, § 201(a), 102 Stat. 4044, 4646 (1988). The amount in controversy
requirement was set at $10,000 in 1958. See Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat.
415. Prior to that it was $3,000. In addition to adjustments in the amount in controversy requirement,
Washington University Open Scholarship
1072 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 76:1067
and applied by federal courts in case law.27 The Constitution provides that,
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, ...
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects. 28 This constitutional provision is the foundation for diversity and
alienage jurisdiction. Since 1789, Congress has conferred this jurisdiction on
the federal courts. The original conferral is in the Judiciary Act of 1789. The
modem incarnation is in 28 U.S.C. § 1332, commonly known as the
"diversity statute."
Although, as one commentator observed, there is a "habitual failure to
consider alienage and diversity as independent bases of federal
jurisdiction,"29 they are not identical, even though the current diversity statute
and all its previous iterations roll them together.30 Diversity jurisdiction is for
citizens of different States within the United States.31 Alienage jurisdiction is
for cases involving a citizen of the United States and a "citizen or subject of a
foreign state. ,
32
Not only do diversity and alienage jurisdiction apply to different types of
parties, they are also founded on different rationales. Diversity jurisdiction is
designed to prevent local bias in the adjudication of suits among U.S.
citizens, so that an out-of-State party is not forced to litigate in a hostile or
unsympathetic environment.33 Alienage jurisdiction seeks to avoid the same
other substantive changes include deeming permanent residents citizens of their domiciled state rather
than aliens, see Federal Courts Study Act, § 203(a), and deeming an insurer's state of citizenship as its
state of incorporation, its principal place of business and the state of citizenship of the insured in
certain types of actions. See Act of Aug. 14, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88439, 98 Stat. 445.
27. The diversity statue, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, is fairly terse, running just over 400 words. However,
annotations to the statue are numerous. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1998) (running more than 600 pages).
The principal case for this Note is the recent Matimak v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 1997), but for a
much earlier treatment of alienage jurisdiction, see Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 12, 14
(1800), which found that the pleadings were inadequate because they alleged that one party was an
alien but failed to state the opposing parties were U.S. citizens. The Court stated, "a description of the
parties is ... indispensable to the exercise ofjurisdiction" under Article III of the Constitution and the
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (repealed 1911). Mossman, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) at 14.
The party seeking jurisdiction must still plead facts to establish jurisdiction. See McNutt v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-89 (1936).
28. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
29. Johnson, supra note 12, at 21.
30. "In the judiciary's formative period, only suits between citizens of different states within the
United States were called 'diversity' suits. Controversies between United States citizens and alien
citizens were called 'alienage' suits. Today, however, the term 'diversity' is commonly understood to
encompass both diversity and alienage jurisdiction." George M. Esahak, Comment, Diversity
Jurisdiction: The Dilemma of Dual Citizenship and Alien Corporations, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 565, 565
n.2 (1982) (citing J. MOORE ETAL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 90.71 [1] n.2 (2d ed. 1982)).
31. For the purposes of this Note, "States" of the United States are indicated by use of a capital
"S," as opposed to "states" with a lower case "s," which are foreign entities.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1998).
33. See, e.g., Smith v. Metropolitan Property and Liability Ins. Co., 629 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1980);
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss3/5
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kind of partiality to denizens of a local jurisdiction, but seeks to do so for
reasons not relevant to diversity jurisdiction. The Framers intended for
alienage jurisdiction to promote a strong central government and healthy
foreign relations.34 Unjust adjudication of cases involving foreign citizens or
subjects could impair foreign relations.35 Therefore, the Framers believed
cases involving aliens should be heard in federal court. Under the
Constitution, States cannot make foreign policy3 6 and should not affect
foreign relations indirectly by adjudicating the rights of foreign subjects. The
Framers feared that State involvement in foreign affairs could lead to war.37
Also, a lack of fairness in State trials involving foreigners could dissuade
foreigners from investing in the United States, which the young Nation
wished to encourage.38
Betar v. De Havilland Aircraft of Canada, Ltd., 603 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1979) (stating that the purpose of
diversity jurisdiction is to prevent local prejudice); Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710 (5th
Cir. 1975); Ziady v. Curley, 396 F.2d 873 (4th Cir. 1968); Burt v. Isthmus Development Co., 218 F.2d
353 (5th Cir. 1955); Winningham v. North Am. Resources Corp., 809 F. Supp. 546 (S.D. Ohio 1992);
Lewis v. Time Inc., 83 F.R.D. 455 (E.D. Cal. 1979), ajfd, 710 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1983); Wheeler v.
Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218 (D.R.L 1978); French v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 407 F. Supp. 13 (D. Del.
1976); Hall v. Fall, 235 F. Supp. 631 (W.D.N.C. 1964); Lutz v. McNair, 233 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Va.
1964), aj/d, 340 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1965); Riley v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Ry., 173 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.
III. 1959); Browne v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 168 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Ill. 1959); Shulman v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 152 F. Supp. 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Detres v. Lions Bldg. Corp., 136 F.
Supp. 699 (N.D. Ill. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 234 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1956); Harris v. Conn.
Light & Power Co., 125 F. Supp. 395 (D. Conn. 1954), a/fd, 221 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1955);
Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Jasspon, 92 F. Supp. 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
34. See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 46-50
(1913) (stating that the Framers wanted strong federal power over foreign affairs and gave jurisdiction
for actions involving foreigners to federal judiciary).
35. As one judge succinctly stated,
The primary reason for diversity jurisdiction is to provide a neutral forum. Another compelling
reason for establish alienage jurisdiction is to avoid entanglements with foreign sovereigns.
Providing a neutral federal forum avoids the appearance of injustice or grounds for resentment in
the relations of the United States with other nations.
Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 116 F.3d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 1997) (Altimari, J., dissenting).
36. Among the difficulties with the Articles of Confederation was that States did endeavor to
create individual foreign policies or treaties.
37. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 11; see also Van Der Schelling v. U.S. News & World Report,
213 F. Supp. 756, 758-61 (E.D. Pa. 1963), cited in Matimak Trading Co., 118 F.3d at 82-83.
38. State court bias ran to citizens of other States as well as foreigners. See Henry J. Friendly,
The Historic Basis ofDiversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REV. 483, 492-93 (1928) (quoting James
Madison, "It may happen that a strong prejudice may arise in some states, against the citizens of
others, who may have strong claims against them.") Madison worried that this bias was bad for trade
and investment, "Mhis has prevented many wealthy gentlemen from trading or residing among us."
James Madison, reprinted in 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION IN
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 528 (1896). Because the world economy is much more integrated now than
at the time the Constitution was drafted, "[t]he economic justifications for alienage jurisdiction in
some ways are currently stronger than at the time of constitutional convention. The increasingly global
economy has resulted in a vast growth of foreign trade by domestic businesses." See Johnson, supra
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Alienage jurisdiction was essentially an uncontroversial part of the
Constitution.3 9 Neither the Constitutional Convention nor the State
conventions of ratification debated the provision extensively.40 Indeed, of the
five plans put before the Constitutional Convention, four of them created
alienage jurisdiction.4' In Federalist No. 80, Alexander Hamilton argued that
all cases involving foreign citizens should be handled by the federal courts.
42
Although at least one anti-Federalist wished to subject aliens to the
prejudices of local tribunals, as adopted, the Constitution provides alienage
jurisdiction.
Congress first conferred diversity and alienage jurisdiction on the federal
courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789.43 Shortly thereafter, case law began to
shape diversity and alienage jurisdiction. In Strawbridge v. Curtiss, the
Supreme Court limited diversity jurisdiction to only those cases with
complete diversity between opposing sides. This meant no common
citizenship could exist "across the v."'45 In Hodgson v. Bowerbank," the
note 12, at 48.
Others argue this concern regarding aliens is unfounded in modem times. See James W. Moore &
Donald T. Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity Jurisdiction: A Supreme Court Fiction Revised, 77
HARV. L. REv. 1426, 1449 (1964); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in
American Court, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1120 (1996) (finding empirical evidence that foreign litigants
win a greater percentage of cases than U.S. citizens, but arguing this fact is explained by an aversion of
foreign parties to seek redress through U.S. courts, resulting in the self-selection of only the most
favorable cases for litigation).
In this context, interesting parallels to China exist. The development of China's legal system is
often stimulated by a desire to attract foreign investment, and U.S. commentators often cite
uncertainties about China's legal system as a risk of doing business there. Notably, a desire to attract
foreign investment shaped the legal history of the United States as well. See generally RONALD C.
BROWN, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COURTS AND LEGAL PROCESS: LAW WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS (1997).
39. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 10.
40. See id
41. See id.
42. See THE FEDERALISTNO. 80, at 517 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Meade Earle ed., 1941).
43. See Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20 § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. From the beginning, the
judicial code has "intermingled" alienage and diversity jurisdiction. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 20.
44. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
45. Id. at 267. A more recent affirmation of the complete diversity requirement is Owen
Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978). Additional case law establishes that
the requirement of complete diversity means aliens may not sue aliens in federal court, nor may a U.S.
corporation suing a foreign corporation in alienage jurisdiction use supplemental jurisdiction to add the
U.S. corporation's foreign subsidiary, because that would destroy complete diversity. See Nike, Inc. v.
Commercial Liberica de Exclusivas Deportivas, S.A., 20 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1994). However,
courts have held that U.S. citizens who are diverse do not destroy that diversity if aliens are on both
sides of the controversy. See Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 106 F.3d 494,
497-98 (3d Cir. 1997); Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 428 (7th Cir.
1993); see also Nancy M. Berkley, Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over Suits Between Diverse United
States Citizens with Aliens Joined to Both Sides of the Controversy Under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(3), 38
RUTGERS L. REv. 71, 75 (1985).
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Supreme Court held that suits between aliens do not qualify for alienage
jurisdiction because the Constitution only authorizes jurisdiction for suits
between a U.S. citizen and an alien.47 Thus, early precedent created
important limitations on alienage and diversity jurisdiction.48
There is also a body of case law determining the meaning of "citizenship"
for corporations and individuals when applying the jurisdictional statute.49
However, much of the early case law has been supplanted by statute.5°
In yet another permutation of the situations not expressly covered in the law, what if a foreign
party opposes a citizen and a "permanent resident"? In Lloyds Bank v. Norkin, 817 F. Supp. 414
(S.D.N.Y. 1993), the court found no jurisdiction. One commentator has suggested that the Lloyds Bank
court ruled that "so fundamental a decision is Strawbridge ... that if Congress had intended to
overrule it in the 1988 amendment, it would have said so expressly somewhere along the line of the
amendment's legislative history, and didn't." David D. Siegel, Commentary On 1988 Revision, 28
U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 1993).
Other cases apply section 1332 to alien corporations. See, e.g., Atlanta Shipping Corp., Inc. v.
Chemical Bank, 631 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 818 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding that a
Liberian corporation with its principle place of business outside the United States was an alien for
jurisdictional purposes); R W. Sawant & Co. v. Ben Kozloff, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 614 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
(finding that an alien cannot have alienage jurisdiction in suit against another alien); Windert Watch
Co. v. Remex Elec. Ltd., 468 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (deciding that a foreign corporation is a
citizen of an entity under the laws of which it is incorporated for purposes of alienage jurisdiction);
Mazzella v. Pan Oceanica A/S Panama, 232 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (finding that a foreign
corporation's ownership by American interests immaterial for purposes of alienage jurisdiction).
46. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809).
47. See id. at 303.
48. The interplay between Article III, congressional action and case law is discussed in Barry
Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1, 2 (1990), noting, "Mhe case law indicates that no precise demarcation of authority between
Congress and the Court exists. Instead, the boundaries of federal jurisdiction-and the authority to
define that jurisdiction-evolve through a dialogic process of congressional enactment and judicial
response." For discussion of the dialogic approach specifically regarding diversity jurisdiction, see id.
at 25-28, and see id. at 28-29 n. 166 on the general indeterminacy of Article EIl and section 1332.
49. See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809) (stating that corporate
citizenship is determined by citizenship of corporation's members); Louisville, Cincinnati &
Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497 (1844) (stating that corporate citizenship is determined by
place of incorporation). There is also a body of case law devoted to determining individual citizenship
in diversity cases. In regard to alienage jurisdiction, Congress decided in 1988 that legal permanent
residents of the United States are, for purposes of section 1332, citizens of their State of domicile. See
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. II, § 203, 102 Stat. 4642
(1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1994)). This means a French citizen with permission to stay
permanently in the United States, for example, through a "green card," may not claim alienage
jurisdiction in a suit against an American citizen. Whether such a French citizen can claim alienage
jurisdiction against, say, a Brazilian corporation is another question. If the lawful permanent resident
is, for purposes of section 1332, a citizen of the United States, then alienage jurisdiction could be
invoked. But doing so arguably creates problems under Hodgson. See supra notes 46-48 and
accompanying text. However, in actions involving the green card holder and a U.S. citizen, the
permanent resident is, under the final paragraph of section 1332(a), a citizen of the State in which she
is domiciled. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
50. Regarding the effectiveness of the 1958 amendment which codified the current corporate
citizenship requirements, one court concluded that the 1958 amendment "did not abolish the fiction of
citizenship based on the State of incorporation. Rather, it wrote into the statute the decisional law on
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Presently, domestic corporations are citizens of two places:5' their place of
incorporation and their principal place of business. Congress created this dual
citizenship in 1958 when it amended section 1332 by adding subsection (C).
5 2
The amendment sought to lessen docket pressures by making complete
diversity harder to obtain, thus limiting access to federal courts.53 It also
the subject and then added another fiction of citizenship based on the principal place of business of a
party." Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 194 F. Supp. 412,413 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
51. There is disagreement about whether foreign corporations should receive the dual citizenship
mandated by section 1332(c)(1). For contrasting views, see Marc Miller, Comment, Diversity
Jurisdiction overAlien Corporations, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1458 (1983) (arguing that section 1332(c)(1)
should not be applied to alien corporations absent clear congressional direction); H. Geoffrey Moulton,
Jr., Note, Alien Corporations and Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 177 (1984)
(arguing that section 1332(c)(1) should be applied to alien corporations). See also Jim Whitlateh, Note,
Diversity Jurisdiction and Alien Corporations: The Application of Section 1332(c), 59 IND. L.J. 659;
Moulton, supra, at 178-79.
Several cases discuss this point. See, e.g., Danjaq, S.A. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 979 F.2d
772 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying subsection (c) dual citizenship to an alien corporation); Pancan Int'l
Management Consultants, Inc. v. STS Microscan, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 1321 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (finding
two Canadian corporations ineligible for diversity jurisdiction); Rauhi v. Harza Eng'g Co., 785 F.
Supp. 1290 (N.D. III. 1992) (applying dual citizenship to a foreign corporation); Carmania Corp., N.V.
v. Hambrecht Terrell Int'l, 758 F. Supp. 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying dual citizenship to a foreign
corporation); Petroleum & Energy Intelligence Weekly, Inc. v. Liscom, 762 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (applying dual citizenship to a foreign corporation); Clifford Corp., N.V. v. Ingber, 713 F. Supp.
575 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (applying dual citizenship to a foreign corporation); Schneider v. Bahama Cruise
Line, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying dual citizenship to a foreign corporation);
Richmond Const. Corp. v. Hilb, 482 F. Supp. 1201 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (applying dual citizenship to a
foreign corporation); Southeast Guar. Trust Co. v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1001 (N.D.
Ill. 1973) (applying duel citizenship to a foreign corporation); Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers
Corp., 246 F. Supp. 634, (S.D.N.Y. 1965), afJ'd, 368 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1007 (1967) (refusing to apply dual citizenship to a foreign corporation); Chemical Transp. Corp. v.
Metropolitan Petroleum Corp., 246 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (refusing to apply dual citizenship to
a foreign corporation).
While not relevant to section 1332 analysis for United States alienage or diversity jurisdiction, a
similar issue of "where is the company" exists in the newer federal system of the European Union. See
Terence L. Blackburn, The Unification of Corporate Laws: The United States, The European
Community and The Race To Laxity, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REv. 1, 1 (1994) ("The choice of law
system used by the majority of the member states of the European Community is based on the siege
reel, or 'real seat' concept, which applies the law of the member state in which the real seat of the
corporation is located, if the real seat is different from the state of incorporation.").
52. For the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), see supra note 13.
53. Specifically with regard to subsection (c), cases express lessening docket pressure as a
rationale for the dual citizenship amendment. See, e.g., Egan v. American Airlines, Inc., 324 F.2d 565
(2d Cir. 1963); Canton v. Angelina Cas. Co., 279 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1960); Crum v. Veterans of
Foreign Wars, 502 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Del. 1980); Salomon Englander Y CIA LTDA v. Israel Discount
Bank, Ltd., 494 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Van Horn v. Western Elec. Co., 424 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.
Mich. 1977); Bender v. Hilton Riviera Corp., 367 F. Supp. 380 (D.P.R. 1973); Boysen v. Treadway
Inn of Lake Harmony, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 96 (E.D. Pa. 1971); National Spinning Co. v. City of
Washington, N.C., 312 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.N.C. 1970); Knee v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc.,
293 F. Supp. 1094 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Carter v. Clear Fir Sales Co., 284 F. Supp. 386 (D. Or. 1967);
Huggins v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 667 (E.D.S.C. 1964); Nayer v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 200 F. Supp. 319 (D.N.H. 1961); Eisenberg v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 189 F. Supp.
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aimed to stop nimble reincorporations from creating instant diversity. 4
Though the Supreme Court and Congress have periodically tinkered with
the diversity statute,55 diversity jurisdiction and to a lesser extent, alienage
jurisdiction, remain a common basis for invoking federal jurisdiction.56
B. The Current Problem-What Is a Foreign State for Purposes of Section
1332(a)(2)?
Section 1332 confers jurisdiction on district courts when a civil suit
involves an amount in controversy greater than $75,000 and is between
"citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state." 57 However,
neither the Constitution nor any iteration of the jurisdictional statute, from the
Judiciary Act of 1789 to the most recent 1996 amendment to section 1332,
defines foreign state as it applies to alienage jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
has not yet defined foreign state under section 1332,58 and lower courts have
reached inconsistent rulings. This section examines two recent, contrary
500 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179 (D. Del. 1960), aJfd, 313
F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1963); Stroup v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 186 F. Supp. 154 (N.D. Ohio 1960);
Johnson v. Angelina Cas. Co., 177 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Tex. 1959), a/T'd, 279 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1960);
Diesing v. Vaughn Wood Prod., Inc., 175 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. Va. 1959); Moesser v. Crucible Steel
Co., 173 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Pa. 1959); Harker v. Kopp, 172 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. I11. 1959).
54. Instant diversity refers to the problem of companies reincorporating in another state in order
to take advantage of diversity jurisdiction, as illustrated in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v.
Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 523 (1928). For rationale on the 1958 amendment, see
Southeast Guaranty Trust Co. v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1001, 1007 (N.D. I11. 1973).
55. Congress made federal jurisdiction harder to obtain by raising the required amount in
controversy from the original level of $500 to the present level of $75,000. Congress intended these
adjustments to reduce swelling federal dockets. See Kristufek v. Saxonburg Ceramics, Inc., 901 F.
Supp. 1018 (W.D.N.C. 1994), a/fJ'd, 60 F.3d 823 (4th Cir. 1995); Young Spring & Wire Corp. v.
American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 220 F. Supp. 896 (D.N.J. 1962); Delaware River Joint Tool
Bridge Comm'n v. Miller, 147 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
56. Parties brought 55,278 diversity cases in federal district courts during the twelve month
period ending September 30, 1997. See Index of Judicial Business (last modified Mar. 10, 1998)
<www.uscourts.gov/judicial-business/02sep.97.pdf>. Statistics are not kept on the percentage of
these cases invoking alienage jurisdiction. There is considerable literature on the perpetual suggestion
to do away with or otherwise seriously curtail diversity jurisdiction. See. e.g., ANTHONY PARTRIDGE,
THE BUDGETARY IMPACT OF POSSIBLE CHANGES IN DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 4 (1988); Victor Eugene
Flango, How Would the Abolition of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction Affect State Courts?, 74
JUDICATURE 35 (1990); Adrienne J. Marsh, Diversity Jurisdiction: Scapegoat of Overcrowded Federal
Courts, 48 BROOK. L. REV. 197 (1982); Russell G. Murphy, "Common Sense Legal Reform" and
Bell's Toll: Eliminating Punitive Damage Claims from Jurisdictional Amount Calculations in Federal
Diversity Cases, 84 KY. L.J. 71 (1995).
Of course, a court must by necessity have the initial jurisdiction to determine if it has jurisdiction.
See Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir. 1972); Alabama v. United States, 314 F.
Supp. 1319, 1321 (S.D. Ala. 1970).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
58. "The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue before us." Matimak Trading Co. v.
Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1997).
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decisions defining foreign state for purposes of obtaining subject matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
1. A Narrow Reading ofForeign State: Matimak Trading Co. v.
Khanly
In Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily,5 9 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that a corporation created under the laws of Hong
Kong, prior to the date the People's Republic of China resumed
sovereignty, 60 is not a citizen of a foreign state and therefore cannot access
the federal courts through alienage jurisdiction.61 Matimak, a creature of
Hong Kong law with its principal place of business in Hong Kong,62 sued
two New York corporations for breach of contract.63 Matimak claimed
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), the portion of the diversity statute
enabling alienage jurisdiction.6
The district court raised the question of subject matter jurisdiction on its
own motion 65 and ultimately dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction.66
59. 118 F.3d 76 (2d Cir, 1997).
60. China resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997. The Matimak court noted that
China would regain control of Hong Kong, but did not announce how the transfer would affect its
ruling had the transfer already occurred. Diversity is determined at the time the suit is brought. See
Louisville New Albany & Chicago Ry. v. Louisville Trust Co., 174 U.S. 552, 566 (1899); Smith v.
Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n.1 (1957). Regarding the general retrocession of Hong Kong, see
Symposium, Hong Kong's Reintegration into the People's Republic of China, 30 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 635 (1997), including Ted Hagelin, Reflections on the Economic Future of Hong
Kong, id. at 701, and Edwin L.-C. Lai, The Economic Implications of the Reunification of Hong Kong
with China, id. at 735. For information regarding the legal treatment of Hong Kong by the People's
Republic of China, see Xianwu Zeng, International Legal Developments in Review: 1996 China Law,
31 INT'L LAW. 509, 511-12 (1997); MUSHKAT, supra note 15.
61. See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 82.
62. For a cogent description of the lower court decision with a helpful review of the other Second
Circuit decision on Hong Kong's status prior to Matimak, see Peter Lam, Comment, The Recognition
of Hong Kong as a Foreign State for Purposes of Diversity: Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 10 FLA.
J. INT'LL. 341 (1995).
63. See Matimak, 118 F.3d at78.
64. See id.
65. Exhortations of the duty to make such an inquiry about the jurisdictional basis of matters are
abundant. See, e.g., Kane v. Ford Motor Co., 450 F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1971); John Birch Soc'y v. Nat'l
Broad. Co., 377 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1967); Wymard v. McCloskey & Co, 342 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1965);
Lowry v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders & Helpers, 259 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.
1958); Roby v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 500 F. Supp. 480 (D. Md. 1980); Jeter v. Jim Walter
Homes, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 791 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Kansas City, Mo. ex rel. Gemco, Inc. v. American
Concrete Forms, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 567 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Cockerham v. Howell, 265 F. Supp. 593
(E.D. La. 1967); DiStefano v. Lehigh Valley RR, 258 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Schroeder v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 242 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
66. See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 78. For the lower court decision, see 936 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (Kimba M. Wood, J.).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss3/5
1998] ALIENAGE JURISDICTION 1079
The district court determined that Hong Kong was not a foreign state for
purposes of section 1332(a)(2) and, perforce, Matimak, as a Hong Kong
corporation, could not be a citizen or subject of a foreign state.67 Thus, the
court held Matimak had no basis to avail itself of federal subject matter
jurisdiction.68 In an opinion that considered alienage jurisdiction at some
length, the appellate court affirred679
On appeal, Matimak did not claim Hong Kong was a foreign state. 0
Rather, it argued Hong Kong had been de facto recognized by the United
States, providing a basis for Hong Kong citizens to claim alienage
jurisdiction in suits against U.S. citizens?. In seeking to invoke alienage
jurisdiction through de facto recognition, the Second Circuit observed that
Matimak was "[i]nvoking the jurisprudence of this Court and others ....
The Second Circuit "established" the "doctrine of de facto recognition" in
Murarka v. Bachrack Bros.73 In Murarka, a partnership from India asserted
alienage jurisdiction to sue a New York corporation in federal court. The
Second Circuit determined alienage jurisdiction existed in Murarka, even
67. See 936 F. Supp. at 152-53.
68. See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 78. In Matimak, the district court essentially reasoned that: (1) the
executive and legislative branches, which are responsible for foreign relations, have not formally
recognized Hong Kong as a foreign state; (2) the judicial branch is not in charge of foreign relations; it
does not, should not and cannot grant recognition to foreign states; and (3) therefore, Hong Kong's
citizens are not citizens or subjects of a foreign state and cannot sue under section 1332(a)(2). See 936
F. Supp. at 152-53.
69. The court recalled its previous observation that the question before it is a "shoal strewn area
of the law." National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 552 (2d Cir. 1988),
quoted in Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76,79 (2d Cir. 1997).
70. SeeMatimak, 118 F.3dat80.
71. See id. Further, the dissent exhaustingly recounts that:
The United States and the international community recognize Hong Kong as an autonomous
force. Congress recognizes Hong Kong as a separate foreign state for the purposes of per-country
numerical limitations under Section 202 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Hong Kong
is: recognized as an autonomous entity in the economic and trade arena; a contracting party to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and thereby accorded most favored nation status by the
United States; considered a member country in the United States Information Agency educational
exchange program; and a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development. Hong Kong is a founding member of the World Trade Organization and strongly
supports an open multilateral trading system and is a member in its own right in several
multilateral economic organizations including the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and the
Asian Development Bank. With respect to the legislative arena and international conventions,
Hong Kong has acceded to the Paris Convention on industrial property, the Beme copyright
convention, and the Geneva and Paris Universal Copyright Conventions.
Id. at 90 (citations omitted). The dissent states, "The facts, actions and other factors discussed above,
when considered in the aggregate, demonstrate an implicit willingness by Congress and explicit
request by the Executive Branch to permit a Hong Kong corporation to litigate its claims in our federal
courts." Id. at 92.
72. Id. at 80.
73. 215 F.2d547 (2dCir. 1954).
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though when Murarka initiated the suit India was not yet recognized as an
independent foreign state.74 In Murarka, the court reasoned, "Unless form
rather than substance is to govern, we think that in every substantial sense by
the time this complaint was filed India had become an independent
international entity and was so recognized by the United States." 75 But forty
years after the Murarka decision, the Second Circuit in Matimak found the
analogy between Hong Kong and India "inap" 76 and refused to find that the
United States had given Hong Kong de facto recognition.
The Matimak court distinguished Murarka in a number of ways."
Besides refusing to find de facto recognition of Hong Kong as a foreign
state,78 the court in Matimak also denied that Hong Kong's status as a colony
of the United Kingdom provided a basis for alienage jurisdiction. The court
noted British sovereignty over Hong Kong would cease on July 1, 1997;
however, at the time Matimak initiated the action, Hong Kong was a British
Dependent Territory.79 Because the United Kingdom is indisputably a
foreign state recognized by the United States,80 the court could have regarded
Hong Kong as a foreign state for diversity purposes through its United
74. SeeMatimak, 118 F.3d at 80.
75. Murarka, 215 F.2d at 552.
76. Matimak, 118 F.3d at 80.
77. The Matimak court noted when the parties initiated the Murarka suit, India was on the cusp
of becoming an independent foreign state, whereas Hang Kong was not becoming independent but
rather being absorbed into China. See id. at 80. And, as then-Judge Harlan noted in Murarka, the
exchange of ambassadors with India which had occurred before the suit was instituted or de jure
recognition of India was conferred, "to all intents and purposes... constituted a full recognition of the
Interim government of India . Murarka, 215 F.2d at 552. The Second Circuit in Matimak
characterized the Murarka analysis as arguably "nothing more than an acknowledgment of the United
States' imminent formal recognition of a sovereign state." Matimak, 118 F.3d at 80.
78. Interestingly, an official in the State Department at first urged that Hong Kong receive de
facto recognition as a foreign state. However, that position was withdrawn via footnote in a brief
supplied by the Justice Department. See Letter from Jim Hergen, Assistant Legal Advisor for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, United States Department of State, to Marshall T. Potashner, Attorney for
Matimak, 3 (June 21, 1996), quoted in Matimak, 118 F.3d at 81-82. Amusingly, by way of a footnote,
the court lectured the Justice Department about the use of footnotes to convey important information,
such as a change of opinion on Hong Kong's de facto status as a foreign state. See Matimak, 118 F.3d
76, 82 n.2 (quoting United States v. Restrepo, 986 F.2d 1462, 1463 (2d Cir. 1993)). For information on
footnotes in legal scholarship, see generally supra note 17.
79. The court stated:
We express no view as to Hong Kong's current status, following Great Britain's transfer of
sovereignty on July 1, 1997. As noted above, diversity of citizenship is determined as of the
commencement of an action. Accordingly, we need not determine the status of Hong Kong, its
residents, or its corporations under Chinese rule for purposes of alienage jurisdiction.
Matimak, 118 F.3d at 80 n.1. Hong Kong has returned to China under the "one country, two systems"
chant, and it is not in fact obvious that Hong Kong corporations are now creatures of Chinese law any
more than they were once citizens of the United Kingdom.
80. Id. at 85.
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Kingdom affiliation. However, the court did not countenance this
argument.
81
The Second Circuit in Matimak interpreted the de facto recognition
doctrine of Murarka and "citizens or subjects" of the United Kingdom
extremely narrowly. The court's desire to dutifully defer to the executive and
legislative branches in matters of foreign policy was the rationale for this
narrow reading of foreign state and citizens or subjects.82 Quoting the
Supreme Court, the Matimak court reiterated, "Who is the sovereign, de jure
or de facto, of a territory, is not a judicial but a political question, the
determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any
government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers,
citizens and subjects of that government."83
81. Under both the British Nationality Act of 1981 and the British Companies Act of 1948, the
court found that Hong Kong citizens, corporate or otherwise, did not enjoy the privileges of British
citizenship. See id. at 85-86. In so holding, the court disregarded the urgings of an amicus curie brief
from the Justice Department which argued that such derivative statehood for the purposes of section
1332 was possible.
Also, the court noted, "When Matimak brought this suit in August 1995, Hong Kong was a
'British Dependent Territory,' British Nationality Act 1981, Sched. 6, and was ruled by a governor
appointed by the United Kingdom.... [In matters of defense and foreign affairs [it] remained
dependent on the United Kingdom." Matimak, 118 F.3d at 81.
Given the fact that Hong Kong was a colonial possession of the United Kingdom, it is interesting
that the court did not consider Hong Kong persons or corporations to be subjects of Great Britain. The
court determined that:
In § 1332(aX2) the terms "citizen" and "subject" do not connote a different "degree of attachment
or allegiance to a foreign state." 1 James Win. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 0.75 (3d
ed. 1996); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 663-664 (1898) [citations omitted]
("The term 'citizen' as understood in our law, is precisely analogous to the term 'subject' in the
common law, and the change of phrase has entirely resulted from the change of government")
Rather, the terms are meant to encompass persons living under distinct forms of government: "A
monarchy has subjects; a republic has citizens." Moore, supra 0.75.
Matimak, 118 F.3d at 85. This comparison between citizen and subject fails to consider that a political
entity might transform its government without transforming all of its subjects into citizens. Subjects
seems most appropriate in the colonial context of Hong Kong, where the United Kingdom never
enfranchised the native population.
82. Although chanting the refrain of "deference," the majority in Matimak, as the dissent points
out, did not cling to the wishes of the executive branch: "In this case, the Department of State and the
Department of Justice unequivocally made their wishes known-they withdrew support of the de facto
recognition of Hong Kong and urged this Court to recognize Hong Kong as a "citizen or subject" of
the United Kingdom." Matimak 118 F.3d at 91.
83. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212, cited in Matimak, 118 F.3d at 80. The Matimak
court noted, "Neither the Constitution nor § 1332(a)(2) defines 'foreign state.' However, '[i]t has
generally been held that a foreign state is one formally recognized by the executive branch of the
United States government."' Matimak 118 F.3d at 79 (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 13B
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3604 (1984)).
Matimak involved the degree to which the executive branch or the Legislature allow federal courts
to have subject matter jurisdiction over foreign parties. At times the other branches wish to force the
judiciary to hear cases involving particular kinds of foreign disputes. See John Yoo, Federal Courts As
Weapons of Foreign Policy: The Case of the Helms-Burton Act, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
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The court reasoned that "at least two compelling reasons" supported
deference to the executive branch in defining foreign state, namely, that
"such deference is consistent with (1) the purposes of alienage jurisdiction
and (2) the well-established analysis for defining a foreign state in related
jurisdictional statutes and constitutional provisions. 84
The Matimak court first argued that the Framers intended alienage
jurisdiction to abet good foreign relations by "treat[ing] the legal
controversies of aliens on a national level."85 The court then tautologically
claimed that one cannot endanger foreign relations by failing to give national
judicial attention to an entity not recognized as a state. "Where the Executive
Branch determines that a foreign entity is not a 'sovereign,' there is no threat
of entanglement with a sovereign stemming from the refusal of a federal
court to treat that entity's citizens in a national forum. 86 The court
acknowledged there could still be "foreign-relations repercussions" if an
unrecognized foreign political entity perceived that State courts treated its
citizens unjustly, but the court maintained:
It is clearly the bailiwick of the Executive Branch, however, to
evaluate the autonomy and resources of a foreign entity in evaluating
whether the entity constitutes a sovereign and independent state; it is
for the Executive Branch, not the courts, to anticipate where potential
'entanglements' with such entities are appreciable enough to recognize
sovereign status.
8 7
Besides believing that deference to the executive branch would serve the
underlying rationale of alienage jurisdiction-to avoid conflicts with foreign
political entities-the court in Matimak also found that "deference to the
Executive Branch for purposes of alienage jurisdiction is further warranted in
light of the well-established jurisprudence surrounding the notion of foreign
state in other jurisdictional statutes." 8 The court referred to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1330(a), 1332(a)(2), 1332(a)(4) and 1441(d), 9 and defended its reading of
section 1332(a)(2) as consistent with the meaning of state in other parts of the
judicial code.90
747 (1997).
84. Matimak, 118 F.3d at 82.
85. Id. at 82 (quoting Iran Handicraft & Carpet Export Ctr. v. MaIjan Int'l Corp., 655 F. Supp.





90. See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 88. Regarding a reference to section 1603 in another part of section
1332, the Lonon court held section 1332(a)(2) does not incorporate by reference the definition of
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The court acknowledged that other courts reached divergent
conclusions.91 It dismissed a number of contrary opinions from district
courts, saying they were not sufficiently analyzed and "should be contrasted
with the two Southern District of New York decisions that have addressed
the issue in more detail. 92 The Matimak court also acknowledged the
Seventh Circuit's divergent holding in Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman)
Ltd.,9 which granted alienage jurisdiction in a suit involving another
corporation from a British Dependent Territory. However, the Matimak court
criticized the Wilson court because it "failed... even to consider whether the
United States recognized the Cayman Islands as a foreign state .... "94
2. A Flexible Reading of Foreign State: Wilson v. Humphreys
(Cayman) Ltd.
In contrast to the Second Circuit's decision in Matimak, decisions in other
circuits have permitted alienage jurisdiction for suits involving a U.S. citizen
and parties from Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, Bermuda and other
political entities that are problematic under the Matimak analysis.95 A leading
foreign state in section 1603. See Lonon v. Companhia De Navegacao Lloyd Basileiro, 85 F.1.D. 71
(E.D. Pa. 1979).
91. See Matimak 118 F.3d at 84-85. Regarding Hong Kong, the court cited Timco Engineering,
Inc. v. Rex & Co., 603 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa. 1985), Refco, Inc. v. Troika Investment Ltd., 702 F.
Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1988), and Creative Distributors, Ltd. v. Sari Niketan, Inc., No. 89-C3614,
available in 1989 WL 105210, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 1989). The court also noted two contrary circuit
opinions about other colonial corporations. See Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239
(7th Cir. 1990) (allowing alienage jurisdiction in a suit by a U.S. citizen against a Cayman Islands
corporation); Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp. v. Madias, 717 F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir. 1983) (allowing
a Bermuda corporation to claim alienage jurisdiction in a suit against a New York corporation). The
Matimak court found the Netherlands court unconcerned with the subject matter jurisdiction question
and the Wilson decision inappropriate because "the court failed ... to even consider whether the
United States recognized the Cayman Islands as a foreign state." Matimak, 118 F.3d at 85; see infra
note 95 and accompanying text
92. Matimak, 118 F.3d at 84.
93. 916 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1990).
94. Matimak, 118 F.3d at 85. Actually, the Wilson court reached a different conclusion on similar
facts not because of a failure to consider the sole issue the Second Circuit found dispositive, but rather
because the Seventh Circuit considered it more important to uphold the policies behind alienage
jurisdiction and took a less formalistic approach more grounded in realism. See infra Part III.
95. As both the Matimak and Wilson courts observed, there has not been a detailed level of
analysis in most of the decisions that granted alienage jurisdiction in cases involving a foreign entity
with a problematic technical status. "Several federal courts have determined, although generally
without discussion, that subject matter jurisdiction existed in suits between citizens of the United
States and Cayman Island corporations." Wilson, 916 F.2d at 1242 (citing Bally Export Corp. v.
Balicar, Ltd., 804 F.2d 398, 399-400 (7th Cir. 1986)). See Philan Ins. Ltd. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 712
F. Supp. 339, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Rolls Royce (Canada) Ltd. v. Cayman Airways, Ltd., 617 F. Supp.
17, 18 (S.D. Fla. 1985); see also Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp. v. Madia, 717 F.2d 731, 735 (2d
Cir. 1983) (finding alienage jurisdiction for a suit involving Berumda, which is a British Dependent
Washington University Open Scholarship
1084 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 76:1067
example of the contrary conclusion is Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd.96
In Wilson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld
the finding of alienage jurisdiction in a suit brought by U.S. plaintiffs against
a Cayman Islands corporate defendant.97
The Wilsons, an American couple from Illinois,98 took a vacation in the
Cayman Islands.99 While in their hotel room in the Caymans, Mrs. Wilson
was the victim of an attempted robbery and rape. 00 She sustained serious
injuries and required hospitalization.'0 ' She and her husband sued
Humphreys, the hotel owner, Holiday Inns, Inc., who licensed Humphreys,
and American Trans Air, Inc., the tour operator. 0 2 Humphreys was
incorporated in the Cayman Islands; Holiday Inns was a Tennessee
corporation; 10 3 and the tour operator was headquartered in Indiana.1
0 4
In Wilson, the Seventh Circuit held that alienage was appropriate to
establish subject matter jurisdiction, 10 5 even though the suit involved a
corporation registered under the laws of an unrecognized state.'0 6 This ruling
Territory just as Hong Kong was and the Cayman Islands remain).
96. 916 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1989).
97. See id.
98. See id. at 1241. The Wilsons departed from Indiana for the trip, which was booked through
an Indiana tour agency. The Wilsons' son was evidently an Indiana resident who booked the trip to the
Cayman Islands for his parents as a gift. The Wilsons lived in Illinois. Indeed, while inveighing against
the application of personal, not subject matter jurisdiction, to the defendant, the court twice mentioned
that the Wilsons, who were suing in Indiana, were from Illinois. See id. at 1249.
99. See id. at 1241.
100. See id.
101. Mrs. Wilson was hospitalized on the Cayman Islands for one week, then returned to the
United States and was treated by a hospital in Indianapolis. See id. at 1241.
102. The Wilsons' claim against the tour organizer was dismissed on summary judgment. See
Wilson, 916 F.2d at 1241 n.1 (citing Wilson v. American Trans Air, Inc., 874 F.2d 386 (7th Cir.
1989)). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's summary judgment
decision for American Trans Air because the Wilsons failed to show that American had a duty to
investigate and warn or that American breached this duty. See American Trans Air, 874 F.2d at 391.
Although the Wilsons did not raise a jurisdictional question in their appeal of the summary judgment
motion granted to American, the court noted that the parties both raised a choice of law issue in the
district court. See id. at 388 n.l. The Wilsons urged application of Indiana while the tour company
sought to apply the law of the Cayman Islands to part of the claim. See id. The court reviewed the
grant of summary judgment to the tour company using the substantive law of Indiana. See Id. Even
under Indiana law, the court found that the Wilsons had no case against the tour company. See id. This
choice of law question intersects importantly with alienage jurisdiction. Even if suits involving foreign
corporations from "quasi-states" gain access to U.S. federal courts, any perceived benefits of such
access can be mitigated by the choice of law question and the fact that federal courts also empanel
juries for many actions. Neither foreign law nor jury trials may be desirable for creating an ideal forum
for adjudicating some disputes, from the point of view of either party.
103. SeeAmerican Trans Air, 874 F.2d at388.
104. Seeid.at387.
105. See Wilson, 916 F.2d at 1243 (upholding the district court's determination that subject matter
jurisdiction existed under section 1332).
106. See British Nationality Act 1981, 31 Halsbury's Statutes 172 (1994) (distinguishing Cayman
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directly contradicts the holding in Matimak as the Wilson court found
alienage jurisdiction in a suit between a U.S. citizen and a corporate citizen
of a British Dependent Territory while the Matimak court did not. The
Seventh Circuit read foreign state more liberally than did the Second Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit determined that the "weight of authority" supported a
finding of subject matter jurisdiction based on section 1332.07 The court
cited, among other cases, Murarka v. Bachrack Bros.' 8 The Seventh Circuit
noted that in Murarka, "Then-Judge Harlan determined that the district court
did have jurisdiction, because the United States had granted de facto
recognition of India by accepting an ambassador from that country."'10 9 In
Wilson, the Seventh Circuit noted that Humphreys, in opposing the finding of
subject matter jurisdiction, "relies on one unpublished district court decision
for support of its assertion that alienage jurisdiction does not apply.""1, 0
However, the weight of authority the Wilson court found persuasive against
this "one unpublished district court decision" was not copious, despite the
Harlan moniker attached to the Murarka decision."' Even though courts had
granted alienage jurisdiction in suits involving British Dependent Territories
more often than they had withheld it, their analysis in doing so, by the
Seventh Circuit's own admission, was sparse."1
2
The Seventh Circuit decision in Wilson was predicated on policy grounds
more than it was influenced by the scattered persuasive authority available on
the question."13 The Wilson court stated, "Certainly, the exercise of American
judicial authority over the citizens of a British Dependent Territory
implicates this country's relationship with the United Kingdom-precisely
the raison d'8tre for applying alienage jurisdiction."' ' 4 In adopting this policy
approach, the court specifically rejected the type of argument accepted in
Islands and other British Dependent Territories from British Commonwealth Countries).
107. See Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239, 1243 (7th Cir. 1989).
108. 215 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1954). Murarka was also discussed by the Second Circuit in Matimak
See supra note 74 and accompanying text. In Murarka, a person from India filed a suit claiming
alienage jurisdiction. The suit was filed before India shed its status as a British colony. See Murarka,
215 F.2d at 552.
109. Wilson, 916 F.2d at 1243 n.5 (citing Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547, 552 (2d Cir.
1954) (Harlan, J.)).
110. Wilson, 916 F.2d at 1242. Humphreys' lawyers, of course, did not have the benefit of the
Second Circuit's analysis in Matimak, which came out eight years after Wilson. In Wilson, Humphreys
relied on St. Germain v. West Bay Leasing, Ltd., CV-81-3945 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
111. Wilson, 916 F.2d at 1242-43.
112. The court noted that several federal courts found alienage jurisdiction in similar
circumstances, "although generally without discussion." Id. at 1242.
113. "Our inquiry therefore must be whether the policies supporting alienage jurisdiction permit a
United States District Court to assume jurisdiction over a citizen of the Cayman Islands." Wilson v.
Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239, 1241 (7th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added).
114. Wilson, 916 F.2d at 1243.
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Matimak. In Matimak, the Second Circuit held that an unrecognized foreign
entity could not be a foreign state under section 1332.115 Humphreys made
this argument to the district court and the Seventh Circuit, urging that the
Cayman Islands is not a foreign state; therefore, Humphreys was not a citizen
or a subject of a foreign state within the meaning of section 1332(a)(2).1" 6
The Seventh Circuit stated that allowing Humphreys to prevail on such a
theory "would allow 'form rather than substance to govern." 'l 17 The court
also cited a case finding alienage jurisdiction available for suits involving a
U.S. citizen and Hong Kong corporations, quoting from a district court
decision since overturned by Matimak, that stated, "[I]t would seem
hypertechnical to preclude Hong Kong corporations from asserting claims in
our courts simply because Hong Kong has not been formally recognized by
the United States as a foreign sovereign in its own right.' 8 Thus, the
Seventh Circuit sought to follow what it regarded as the policy principles
behind alienage jurisdiction and the realities of the situation rather than be
distracted by "hypertechnical" points that privileged form over substance.
III. ANALYSIS & PROPOSAL: THE DRAWBACKS OF BOTH THE
HYPERTECHNICAL READING OF FOREIGN STATE IN MATIMAK AND
THE MORE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION IN WILSON, AND A
PROPOSAL FOR A MIDDLE PATH
As the Second Circuit noted in Matimak, "Neither the Constitution nor
§ 1332(a)(2) defines 'foreign state..''.. So what should circuit and district
courts do when confronted with this problem? How should they determine
what constitutes a foreign state when faced with a jurisdictional claim under
section 1332? This question is the core of the matter, because once a political
entity is identified as a foreign state, its citizens or subjects are encompassed
under the plain language of section 1332(a)(2).120 Matimak and Wilson
exhibit two alternative readings of foreign state, one of which is narrow, the
115. See supra Part ll.B.1.
116. See Wilson, 916 F.2d at 1242.
117. Id at 1243 (quoting Mararka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1954) (Harlan,J.)).
118. Wilson, 916 F.2d at 1243 (quoting Tetra Finance (HK) Ltd. v. Shaheen, 584 F. Supp. 847
(S.D.N.Y. 1984)). This hypertechnical allegation about the alternative disposition (that Hong Kong is
not a state and therefore alienage jurisdiction is inappropriate) was duly noted in the Matimak decision,
though the Second Circuit finally decided it did not mind being hypertechnical within its perceived
constitutional role by showing deference to the Executive Branch in matters of foreign relations. See
Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 83 (2d Cir. 1997).
119. Matimak, 118 F.3dat 79.




other more flexible. This section analyzes the weaknesses of both the
Matimak and the Wilson approaches and argues that a flexible approach
closer to Wilson is preferable.
A. Problems with Matimak
The Matimak decision is formalistic. 121 The court determined that Hong
Kong was not a foreign state and thus denied jurisdiction to a Hong Kong
citizen's suit.122 Whatever technical status Hong Kong had when the court
decided the case or has since acquired, it is clearly a foreign political entity. It
is equally clear that United States citizens, both corporate and individual,
conduct a considerable amount of trade with Hong Kong.123 Thus, Hong
Kong is a foreign political entity with whom Americans have extensive
contacts. However, an American could not sue citizens of Hong Kong in
federal court, nor could Hong Kong's citizens sue U.S. citizens in federal
court, without some basis for subject matter jurisdiction other than alienage
jurisdiction.
The Second Circuit's ruling in Matimak excludes disputes involving the
billions of dollars in annual trade between the United States and Hong Kong
from federal courts based on alienage jurisdiction, but such suits from the
Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) are allowed.' 24 Even though Hong
Kong corporations and individuals might now be eligible under Matimak for
alienage jurisdiction in suits against U.S. parties, 125 the exclusion remains for
121. A vast literature exists on the subject of formalism and realism. See Victoria F. Nourse,
Making Constitutional Doctrine in a Realist Age, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1401, 1402 (1997) (noting the
emergence of a "new formalism").
122. SeeMatimak, 118 F.3d at 82.
123. "Hong Kong is the United States' twelfth-largest trading partner, with direct United States
financial investment of almost twelve billion dollars." Id. at 81. Regarding ongoing investment in
Hong Kong and the SAR's role as a conduit for investment in the mainland, see Mark Thompson,
Chasing The Emerald City: As Hong Kong Reverts to Chinese Control, U.S. Lawyers Hope to Cash in
on the Mainland's Need for Capital, CAL. LAw., July 1997, at 48, and Richard Marsland et al.,
Shattered Dreams, FIN. TIMES Jan. 27, 1998, at 18, available in 1998 WL 3527813.
124. See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 81 (citing Bank of Hawaii v. Balos, 701 F. Supp. 744, 746-47 (D.
Haw. 1988)).
125. Might is the operative word. Hong Kong's retrocession is governed by the Basic Law, which
assures continuation of Hong Kong's systemic characteristics for 50 years. Thus, while Hong Kong is
now again part of mainland China, its corporate law is not People's Republic of China ("P.R.C.")
corporate law, and the degree of sovereignty the P.R.C. yields it, to a considerable degree, is
attenuated in the same fashion that Great Britain's control over Hong Kong was too attenuated for the
Second Circuit. For discussion of the P.R.C.'s Company Law, adopted in 1994, see Nicholas C.
Howson, China's Company Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? A Modest Complaint, 11
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 127 (1997); Chuan Roger Peng, Note, Limited Liability in China: A Partial
Reading ofChina's Company Law of1994, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 263 (1996).
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the Cayman Islands 126 and other places. These might sound like exotic
locales whose exclusion from federal courts through alienage jurisdiction is
not of great consequence; however, these 'Jurisdictions are the international
equivalent of Delaware or Nevada for many clients."'
127
Moreover, the executive branch decision to recognize a political entity as
a foreign state is almost certainly driven by factors far beyond the scope of
the diversity statute. If the executive or legislative branch, by formal
recognition or derecognition of a foreign state, intends to enable or limit
alienage jurisdiction, doing so is clearly within the constitutional prerogative
of those branches. However, if the court defers to another branch when the
executive or legislative branch has not made such a determination about
jurisdiction, then the court's deference produces consequences not
intentionally sought by any branch of government. For political reasons, the
other branches might not want to recognize a nation formally, even if they
want to allow alienage jurisdiction for suits involving their corporations.
In Matimak, the court's deference to the executive branch actually
functioned as a deference to the British parliament. Because neither the
United States Department of State nor Congress recognized Hong Kong as
an independent sovereignty, the court looked to British law to determine if
Hong Kong corporations or individuals were citizens of the United Kingdom.
Thus, a strict reading of foreign state, while ostensibly showing fidelity to the
constitutional scheme of separation of powers, actually can cause results
undesired by any branch of government.128
B. Problems with Wilson
While the narrow reading of foreign state in Matimak can-and did-
126. Interesting in this regard is the recent announcement by Fruit of the Loom that it will form a
parent company in the Cayman Islands to improve its financial position. See George Gunset, Fnrit of
the Loom Takes New Tack, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 12, 1998, § 2, at 1.
127. See Wilson & Cooperman, supra note 18, at B9.
128. The case of Taiwan is representative. The diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of
China and derecognition of Taiwan was geared to political ends far beyond the scope ofjurisdictional
concerns. Even after Taiwan's derecognition by the United States, citizens and subjects of Taiwan are
still allowed access to federal courts through diversity jurisdiction presumably on the premise that
Taiwan was formerly recognized. See Chang v. Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 506 F. Supp. 975 (N.D.
Ill. 1980). The Matimak court noted the case of Taiwan, observing "once the United States recognizes
an entity as a sovereign state.. . a subsequent withdrawal of recognition of that state's government
does not effect a change in the underlying recognition of the states as an international judicial entity.
Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 84 n.3"(2d Cir. 1997) (citing Iran Handicraft and Carpet
Export Ctr. v. Marijan Int'l Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1275, 1277-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). This logic is difficult
to square with the court's reasoning that the decision to provide foreign relations benefits of alienage




produce undesirable results, the more open reading of foreign state in Wilson
also raises potential problems. The disadvantage of Wilson's flexible
approach is that it could conceivably grant jurisdiction for suits involving
citizens of entities that the other branches specifically intended to deny
access to American federal courts. There are a number of cases holding, for
example, that Palestine is not a foreign state for purposes of alienage
jurisdiction. 129 The Palestinian situation, like the situation in Taiwan, 130 is
extremely delicate, and courts should not intrude on the role of the other
branches to recognize states, especially when doing so could upset global
politics.
One could imagine, as the ultimate extension of the flexible reading of
foreign state in Wilson or a liberal use of the de facto recognition test of
Murarka13 1 the following: allowing corporations registered under the "laws"
of the Republic of Texas 32 to claim alienage jurisdiction in suits against U.S.
citizens. While far-fetched, such a result is conceivable if the interpretation of
foreign state is left to unfettered judicial whim. Thus, there is a tension
between the undesirable result of Matimak and potential problems of
liberally following Wilson's casual disregard for the recognition question.
C. Proposal
Both the approach taken by the Second Circuit and the approach taken by
the Seventh Circuit are problematic. The Second Circuit's opinion in
Matimak reaches an undesirable result using persuasive logic.' In Wilson,
129. See Abu-Zeineh v. Federal Labs, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 774 (W.D. Va. 1949).
130. See supra note 128.
131. Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., Inc., 215 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1954).
132. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Separatists End Texas Standoff as 5 Surrender, N.Y. TIMES, May
4, 1997, at Al. Such antigoverment movements would likely be enthusiastic users of a ruling that
allowed them to file suits in federal court because corporations they charter would be considered
foreign corporations. See Deb Reichmann, Bogus Liens Gum up Gears of Justice Law: Common Law
Courts Are Springing up Around U.S., Surpassing Nuisance Level of the Militia Movement, Flood of
Filings Can Be Nightmare for Police and Jurists, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1998, at A20.
133. This point is made by Bradford Williams in another recent Note. See Bradford Williams,
Note, The Aftermath of Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily: Is the American System Ready for Global
Interdependence? 23 N.C. J. INT'L. L. & COM. REG. 201 (1997). Williams concludes the Matimak
decision was supported by precedent and was faithful to the constitutional scheme of separation of
powers, even though he acknowledges the decision "may have undermined the basis for enacting
§ 1332(a)(2)... [and was] contrary to international law, without regard to the consequences it might
have on American foreign relations." Id. at 225. Williams simply notes that "if the executive and
legislative branches disagree with the Second Circuit's decision, the onus should be on them to clarify
which entities can invoke alienage jurisdiction." Id. This Note generally concurs with Williams'
observations about the tension between a loose and narrow reading of foreign state; however, the
proposal differs. This Note proposes that the judiciary adopt a flexible reading of foreign state unless
the executive branch voiced some explicit contrary intention. This gives courts flexibility in a dynamic
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the Seventh Circuit reaches a result that seems more appealing and
pragmatic. However, the Second Circuit's more recent, hypertechnical ruling
seems, at least ostensibly, more faithful to the dictates of statutory
interpretation, the separation of powers doctrine and judicial restraint. It does
not, however, reach a result salutary for international trade, 34 and it runs
counter to the policies for which the Framers established alienage
jurisdiction, despite the court's circular arguments to the contrary. What
accommodation might be struck between these two approaches, so that
alienage jurisdiction as created in the Constitution is available in appropriate
cases but not to all comers? How could a court not willing to usurp the
authority of the other branches reach a conclusion different than Matimak?
The dissent in Matimak noted there were at least three ways the court
could have found that Matimak was a citizen or subject of a foreign state, as
required for alienage jurisdiction under section 1332(a)(2). Judge Altimari
noted:
There are adequate constitutional, statutory and prudential grounds to
open our federal courts to Matimak by: (1) recognizing Hong Kong as
a "foreign state" for the limited purpose of alienage diversity
jurisdiction; (2) recognizing Hong Kong as a political subdivision of a
foreign state; or (3) recognizing Hong Kong's people and entities as
"citizens or subjects" of the United Kingdom today and after July 1,
1997, of the People's Republic of China.' 3
5
Each of these alternative grounds for finding alienage jurisdiction in Matimak
would have been better attuned to the complex issues involved than the
hypertechnical holding of the majority.136 The executive branch, not the
court, manages foreign relations, but granting jurisdiction under section 1332
is something less than opening an embassy and exchanging ambassadors.' 37
global economy and prevents Matimak-style, counterintuitive denials ofjurisdiction with major trading
partners, while it does not usurp executive function when the executive will is expressed.
134. In Matimal; the court had before it a letter from the State Department's legal advisor for East
Asian and Pacific affairs, averring that Hong Kong is the twelfth-largest trading partner of the United
States and that U.S. citizens invest nearly 12 billion dollars in Hong Kong. See Matimak Trading Co.
v. Khalily, 118 F.3d at 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1997). Although many international trade disputes are
contractually bound to arbitration, when an arbitral award is given and a party seeks enforcement in
federal court, the jurisdiction issue can still arise. See Riccio v. Gray, 852 F. Supp. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(finding no subject matter jurisdiction for an action involving an arbitration award when neither
federal question or diversity jurisdiction existed).
135. Matimak, 118 F.3d at 92 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
136. See generally Hartwing Bungert, Equal Protection for Foreign and Alien Corporations:
Towards Intermediate Scrutiny for a Quasi-Suspect Classification, 59 MO. L. REV. 569 (1994)
(suggesting some prevalence of discrimination against foreign companies in U.S. courts).




The courts should not wade into the murky waters of who is or is not a
legitimate sovereign. On the other hand, one doubts that the State
Department or the President recognizes foreign entities with an eye to
providing their citizens (corporeal or corporate) with alienage jurisdiction in
federal courts. Indeed, many things may stimulate the recognition or
derecognition of foreign entities, and in some cases, such recognition reflects
political realities beyond whether the state is substantial enough to merit
recognition. For example, the United States did not have diplomatic relations
with the People's Republic of China until 1978, and today the United States
does not recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan) as a state, even though
Taiwan is one of the United States' leading trading partners. The "one
China' policy is a diplomatic sleight of hand to gloss over a geopolitical
point of tension. 38 Currently, Taiwan is recognized as a foreign state for
purposes of section 1332 because it once was recognized as a foreign state,
even though Taiwan's diplomatic recognition was removed in 1978. Such a
pragmatic result does not comport with the hypertechnical reading of
Matimak. So, while the judiciary should not conduct foreign policy, the
vicissitudes of foreign policy should not be allowed to warp the judicial
process. The list of formally recognized foreign states simply does not
necessarily reflect intentional policy determinations about alienage
jurisdiction eligibility. Thus, formalistic reliance on such a list does not
achieve deference to the executive branch in foreign affairs, ostensibly the1 39 40
purpose of such reliance. Moreover, as cases involving Taiwan, Iran,
Cuba, 14 1 Palestine 142 and India' 43 have shown, sovereignty and recognition
does not necessarily follow that the executive branch should determine which entities are foreign states
for alienage jurisdiction. In Federalist No. 80, Alexander Hamilton argued all claims involving aliens
should be before national tribunals. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Indeed, the article the
Matimak court cited for its background that alienage jurisdiction is aimed at promoting good foreign
relations did not suggest such good relations were necessary only with recognized states, or that the
executive branch could determine which foreign entities needed the neutral forum of the federal courts.
Matimak, 118 F.3d at 83 (citing Kevin R Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations
and Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction over Disputes Involving Non-Citizens, 21 YALE 3.
INT'LL. 1 (1996)).
138. See Joint Communique, Feb. 28, 1972, U.S.-P.R.C., 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 443, 445
(1972); Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States of
America and the People's Republic of China, Dec. 15, 1978, U.S.-P.R.C., 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
274(1979).
139. See Chang v. Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 506 F. Supp. 975, 978 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
140. See Iran Handicraft & Carpet Export Ctr. v. Marian Int'l Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
141. See Calderone v. Naviera Vacuba S/A, 325 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1963); Betancourt v. Mutual
Reserve Fund Life Ass'n., 101 F. 305, 306 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1900).
142. See Abu-Zeineh v. Fed. Labs, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 774 (W.D. Pa. 1994); Klausner v. Levy, 83
F. Supp. 599, 600 (E.D. Va. 1949).
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are not immutable. Governments come and go; political realities change.
Therefore, the Wilson "rule of reason" is the more sophisticated approach. It
should be used absent some express, contrary indication from the State
Department or Congress that alienage jurisdiction should be denied to a
particular foreign entity. Informal communication similar to the type in
Matimak could be used as an ersatz certification of the question.
The difficulty of stateless corporations is particularly interesting in light
of the global trend toward multinational trade alliances. 14 4 In particular, the
European Union (EU) is considering creating various Pan-European business
entities under EU law. 145 How would such an entity fit into section 1332?
The European Union is not a state; its members do not plan to yield all their
sovereignty to the EU. Even more than Hong Kong or the Cayman Islands,
the corporations created under the laws of the EU are likely to include
important trading partners of the United States. While such corporations will
not be creatures of the municipal laws of recognized states, surely they
should not be denied alienage jurisdiction on such a formalistic basis.
Given on the one hand the "colony problem" represented by Matimak and
Wilson, and on the other hand the emerging problem of pan-regional business
forms represented by EU proposals, courts should recognize "derivative
sovereignty" and "composite sovereignty" for purposes of alienage
jurisdiction under section 1332(a)(2). This proposal maintains judicial
deference to the executive and legislative branches in terms of foreign policy,
as deemed vital in Matimak, but also allows a flexibility in reading foreign
state under the statute.
The people and corporations that inhabit the colonial territories at issue in
Matimak and Wilson are neither citizens of independent sovereigns nor full
citizens of the colonial power. Yet they are hardly stateless in the typical
sense.' 46 They represent a species of political entity which derives from a
143. See Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1954)
144. Although corporations are creatures of state law in the United States, in many other nations
business forms are a product of national law, and some have suggested a nationally uniform system of
business organization law would be an improvement in the United States. See John H. Matheson &
Brent A. Olson, A Callfor a Unijied Business Organization Law, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1996).
145. See David C. Donald, Company Law in the European Community: Toward Supranational
Incorporation Incorporation, 9 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1, 10-24 (1991) (discussing proposals for Pan-
European Union company law).
146. See Christine Biancheria, Restoring the Right to Have Rights: Statelessness and Alienage
Jurisdiction in Light ofAbu-Zeineh v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., I 1 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 195
(1996).
Many cases address the stateless person issue. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Malaxa, 241 F.2d 129 (2d
Cir. 1957) (finding a foreign litigant whose home nation had revoked his citizenship ineligible for
alienage jurisdiction); Ligi v. Regnery Gateway, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 159, (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that




recognized state. In the future, it is possible if not likely that corporations,
and perhaps even natural persons, will exist with the legal status that attaches
to a composite of yielded sovereignties of recognized states, such as the
contemplated Pan-European business form. Such composite sovereignty,
when created by recognized states, should also qualify for alienage
jurisdiction under section 1332(a)(2). These concepts of derived sovereignty
or composite sovereignty in conjunction with a rule of reason plus
interlocutory appeal 147 to the executive branch in uncertain cases will allow
the courts to apply the diversity statute in alienage jurisdiction cases without
the formalism of Matimak or the potential open-ended problems of Wilson.148
IV. CONCLUSION
Federal circuits have reached divergent conclusions about what
constitutes a foreign state for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). A recent
Second Circuit opinion reads foreign state narrowly to deny alienage
jurisdiction to a corporation from Hong Kong, which was then a British
Dependent Territory. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit determined alienage
jurisdiction exists when a corporation from the Caymans Islands-also a
British Dependent Territory-is sued by a U.S. party. A flexible reading of
foreign state is preferable in an age of increasing global trade, particularly
because recognition of foreign states by the nonjudicial branches of
government is not likely to turn on, or even contemplate, the ramifications on
section 1332. Courts should look for derivative or composite sovereignty,
apply a rule of reason and allow diversity jurisdiction when the foreign state
is a political entity with which the U.S. has substantial economic and political
ties, unless the coordinate branches have expressly declared otherwise.
Walter C. Hutchens
himself of foreign citizenship to become stateless); Reyes v. Penoci, 202 F. Supp. 436 (D.P.RI 1962)
(finding that a stateless person is also ineligible for jurisdiction in Puerto Rico under specific
jurisdictional statutes); Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubinstein, 133 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (finding
stateless persons ineligible for alienage jurisdiction).
147. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994), which provides for interloctory appeal of orders of district
courts. Here, of course, I mean an informal conferal between the courts and coordinate branches.
148. For strict textualists, this approach may seem to contravene the constitutional scheme by
giving judges foreign relations power, but as argued above, the ostensible adherence to strict deference
to the executive or legislative branches in identifying foreign state under section 1332(a)(2) can
actually produce consequences unintended by those branches, and these proposals can be pursued by
the judiciary even as Congress retains the power to expressly determine how foreign state should be
interpreted. This dialogic process is typical of the way diversity jurisdiction has actually developed.
See supra note 48. "To be sure, federal courts undoubtedly engage in interstitial 'lawmaking,' as part
of the process of interpreting positive law." Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural
Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1248 (1996).
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